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Abstract 
At a brewery in 1997, an operator confused filling nozzles for two commonly 
used acid cleaning agents and transferred nitric acid into a tank with P3, a 
proprietary phosphoric acid based cleaner that also contained 5-15 percent 
isopropanol.  10-15 minutes later the mixture exploded violently.  The stainless 
steel tank disintegrated with such force that fragments lodged in walls of 
concrete.  The explosion ravaged the cellar, destroyed equipment, blew out a 
masonry wall and released large amounts of nitrous oxide fumes.  Likely, 62 
percent nitric acid (CAS 7697-37-2) and isopropanol (2-propanol, CAS 67-63-
0) reacted to produce isopropyl nitrate (nitric acid 1-methylethyl ester, CAS 
1712-64-7), a rocket propellant.  It is argued that the accident has broad 
learning potential because of the widespread usage of the two chemicals across 
industries, the innocent nature of the human error and the severity of the 
consequence.  
A review 15 years later of lessons learned finds that information dissemination 
has followed a tradition of informal meetings in small industry sector 
associations but impact is unclear.  There is no useful mention of the accident 
in open sources. Although the Danish Working Environment Authority took the 
brewery to court for negligence, they did not report or investigate the accident, 
or attempt to disseminate information available to them.  Today, the general 
literature is silent on the explosion hazards of mixing the two chemicals.   
The paper argues that without institutional support, learning opportunities are 
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• clean-in-place (CIP) 
• nitric acid 
• chemical incompatibility 
• explosion 





• Clean-in-place (CIP) chemicals  present serious chemical incompatibility 
hazards 
• Inadvertent mixing produced a violent explosion with multiple fatality 
potential 
• The accident company took effective precautions to prevent recurrence 
• There is no evidence of broader learning, indeed the accident has 
disappeared from open sources 
• It appears critical to provide institutional support and to set up systems that 
facilitate learning 
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1.1 Learning from accidents  
Learning from accidents and misfortune is not a novel accident prevention 
strategy, humans have learned from their mistakes from ages past.  In its 
modern form, key characteristics are that past mishaps shall be recorded and 
analysed to extract lessons learned, which in turn shall be disseminated through 
broad feedback loops in order to prevent future similar, and not just identical, 
accidents.  This feedback is one of the pillars of a safety management process 
and an essential tool in the framework of prevention.  Evidently, it makes good 
sense to share the lessons learned from unwanted outcomes in order to 
minimize the number of times the same lessons have to be learned (Hedlund 
and Andersen, 2006; Dien et al. 2012).   
The idea has been championed and popularized by e.g. Trevor Kletz in the 
book  “What went wrong?”  (Kletz 1988).  A later book by the same author 
titled “Still going wrong” (Kletz 2003) hint that although learning from past 
accidents is a conceptually simple idea, major obstacles to practical 
implementation do exist and opportunities are foregone, see also Kletz (2004).   
Learning from accidents has been an active area of safety research for at least 
two decades and a substantial body of literature exits.  Lindberg et al. (2010) 
offer a description of the CHAIN model for experience feedback, which 
comprise six activities (1) reporting, (2) selection, (3) investigation, (4) 
dissemination, (5) prevention, and (6) evaluation.  The CHAIN model 
summarizes ideas that are well-known from the accident investigation literature 
and it is truly a chain in the sense that the process as a whole fails if any one of 
its links fails. 
Lindberg et al. (2010) observe that most of the literature is concerned with 
certain parts of the experience feedback process, in particular the accident 
investigation methodology.  Much less has been written on the activities that 
take place before or after the accident investigation, such as initial reporting, 
dissemination and uptake of lessons learnt.  This paper deals with precisely 
these activities in examining the immediate post-accident phase after a serious 
chemical incompatibility accident.  The case also offers an opportunity to study 
the learning that subsequently took place: the technical measures taken at the 
site to prevent recurrence, the extent to which the new explosion risk insights 
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were understood and communicated to the safety community at large, and 
sharing the lessons learned with peers and other potential beneficiaries. 
1.2 An accident case with broad learning potential  
In 1990s, a Danish brewery used two acidic cleaning agents in its clean-in-
place (CIP) system: nitric acid and P3 Trimeta HC (henceforth: P3), a speciality 
tank cleaner for the brewing industry.  The data sheet for P3 described the 
product as an "Acid cleaning agent based on an aqueous solution of phosphoric 
acid, phosphonic acids, non-ionic surfactants and stabilizers". The product also 
contained some isopropanol.  The brewery received concentrated solutions of 
both cleaning agents.  In 1997, an operator confused two nozzles when topping 
up CIP tanks and transferred 62 percent nitric acid into the P3 tank, which 
exploded shortly after.  The severity of the explosion indicates that a detonation 
took place.  In all likelihood, nitric acid and isopropanol reacted to produce 
isopropyl nitrate, a rocket propellant.   
Nitric acid and isopropanol are very common industrial chemicals in the food 
and drinks industry and elsewhere, often handled manually, and trivial errors 
such as inadvertent mixing are to be expected, unless special precautions are 
taken.  The explosion hazard was unknown to the brewery; to the Danish 
Working Environment Authority, and to the national vendor of P3.  We argue 
that the lesson learned from this accident, that mixing of two common 
industrial chemicals can produce a potent explosive with multiple fatalities 
potential, would be a prime candidate for experience feedback and learning as it 
has broad relevance for industry, authorities and safety professionals working 
with preventive risk analysis.  
1.3 The two CIP cleaning agents 
Nitric acid is highly suitable for removing mineral deposits (scale) and other 
alkaline deposits commonly encountered in the foods and drinks industry, in 
piping systems, heat exchangers and tanks.  Nitric acid does not corrode 
stainless steel and the cost is a fraction of that of phosphoric acid.  It is 
therefore a popular cleaning agent, often in solutions of one percent or less.   
The P3 product was a speciality cleaning agent developed for breweries based 
on phosphoric acid.  Additives comprised isopropanol, surfactants, anti-
foaming agents, corrosion inhibitors and fungicides against unwanted moulds 
and yeasts encountered in brewing operations (Table 1). 
Table 1 Composition of P3, an acidic speciality CIP cleaner 
Ingredient CAS Content Hazard symbol 
Phosphoric acid 7664-38-2 >30 percent Corrosive (C) 




Not stated < 5 percent None 
Butyl diglycol 112-34-5 < 5 percent None 
Violent explosion after inadvertent mixing of nitric acid and isopropanol – review 15 years later finds basic accident data 
corrupted, no evidence of broad learning 





126-71-6 < 5 percent Irritant (Xi) 
Fatty alcohol 
propoxylate 
Not stated < 5 percent None 
Phosphonate Not stated < 5 percent None 
Source: Danish safety data sheet for P3-trimeta HC, 1994 
1.4 Ambiguous SDS information on chemical 
incompatibilities 
The brewery’s Safety Data Sheets (SDS) for nitric acid stated acute health 
effects, the chemical’s corrosive and irritant action and ability to produce 
chemical burns, skin ulcerations, damage to mucous membranes and eyes.  The 
SDS warned that being a strong oxidizing agent, reactions with concentrated 
nitric acid often liberates much heat, at times violently, and that combustible 
materials may ignite.  It listed two risk phrases: R8 - Contact with combustible 
material may cause fire; and R35 - Causes severe burns.  The SDS emphasized 
that reactions often produce toxic red-brown coloured fumes of nitrous oxides.  
They are feared because poisoning initially can be non-symptomatic with fatal 
complications (lung oedema) developing hours later - the SDS mentioned a past 
fatal accident of this type at Carlsberg, another Danish brewery.   
The SDS for P3 stated its corrosive and irritant properties and potential to 
produce chemical burns and eye damage.  Of chemical incompatibilities, the 
concern was acidity: that mixing with chlorine (hypochlorite) cleaners could 
liberate chlorine gas, and that reaction with certain metals could produce 
hydrogen, an explosive gas. The SDS listed one risk phrase: R34 - Causes 
burns. 
1.5 Sources 
After the explosion, the Danish Working Environment Authority took the 
brewery to court for violation of its general obligations to plan and execute 
work in a safe manner.  The court proceedings and other documents, which 
constitute the basis for this paper, comprise: 
• A police investigation report 
• Correspondence between the brewery, the P3 vendor and the Danish 
Working Environment Authority. 
• A Danish translation of a German laboratory’s investigation of the hazards 
of mixing P3 and nitric acid. 
The brewery kindly provided access to court documents, correspondence, 
photographs and an April 2012 site visit and interview with the then production 
supervisor.  The brewery has been helpful and forthcoming but has asked not to 
be named. 
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2 Accident sequence and severity 
2.1 Layout 
The brewery kept chemicals for the CIP system in tanks in a cleaning hall 
known as cellar 11.  The tanks were connected to nozzles mounted on an 
outside wall panel.  The panel had seven nozzles, from left: nitric acid, P3, 
caustic soda (NaOH), hot and cold water, air and glucose.  The nozzles for 
nitric acid and P3 were identical, the others were different.  When the level of a 
chemical tank ran low an operator would fetch a drum or pallet tank, connect 
the discharge hose of a portable dip pump to the correct nozzle at the panel and 
transfer the contents.  The same dip pump and discharge hose was used for 
nitric acid and P3.  At the time, the brewery simply viewed the two chemicals 
as “acids”. 
In cellar 11, the stainless steel tanks for nitric acid and P3 were identical.  
Detailed drawings no longer exist.  Brewery workers recall that the tanks were 
pressure less - an overflow pipe routed excess material to a floor drain under 
the tanks.  The volume was 1.7 m3, construction material was probably 316L, 
shell thickness minimum 3 mm, possibly 5 mm. 
Cellar 11 is a basement with approximate dimensions length x breadth x height 
20 x 15 x 7 m  (Figure 1).  Strong concrete walls and pillars help support the 
load of beer fermentation tanks originally located on the floor above.  The two 
CIP tanks were located between a caustic tank, a tank with recycled water and a 
filter unit.  Two heated glucose tanks were located in an insulated 
compartment.  At the centre rear, a couple of concrete steps lead up to a 
walkway and access doors leading to the neighbour cellar.   Next to the 
concrete steps, a metal staircase provided access to an elevated platform. 
2.2 The explosion 
On November 28, 1997, an afternoon shift operator checked the level gauges: 
the nitric acid tank was almost empty, and the P3 tank almost full.  He fetched 
an intermediate bulk container (IBC) pallet tank at the outdoor chemicals 
storage area and brought it to the nozzle panel.  The dip pump was already 
connected to a receiving nozzle.  He did not realize that the hose was connected 
to the wrong nozzle and started the transfer.  
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The explosion took place 10-15 minutes after the onset of the transfer when 
about 100 – 250 litres of nitric acid had been transferred.  Thick clouds of 
reddish-yellow nitrous oxides billowed out of the damaged building 
Moments before the explosion, another operator had walked through cellar 11 
on his way to the filter room.  He would have passed the P3 tank at close 
distance, perhaps 2-3 m, but did not notice anything unusual.  The many people 
working day shift had recently left the premises.  Fortuitously, nobody was in 
the area at the time of the explosion, and there were no casualties.   
The fire and rescue services dosed the area for hours to knock down fumes and 
dilute the acid.  A light wind took fumes away from nearby residential areas.  
Warnings were broadcast over the local radio station and from police cars with 
loudspeakers urging town centre residents (several thousand) to close doors and 
windows and stay indoors for about two hours.  The fire and rescue services 
said that siren warnings and evacuations would have been necessary, had the 
wind direction been less favourable. 
According to meteorological data (Wundergrund) from an airport 40 km away, 
the wind came from the east at 2-3 m/s.  The sky was partly cloudy and twilight 
was setting in.  The temperature over the prior 12 hours had ranged from -2°C 
to +1 °C.   
2.3 Explosion damage 
The explosion ravaged cellar 11, destroying equipment and blowing out a 3x4 
m wall section behind the glucose tanks. Bricks were scattered outside over 
perhaps 10-15 m.  A 3x5 m wall panel with door and windows frames blew out 
landing 20 m away in front of a single story office building, some parts landed 
at the other side of the building, approximately at distance 40 m.  Glass 
fragments from shattered windows were found lodged in wood clad surfaces, 
e.g. a contractor trailer at distance 25 m.  Doors to the adjacent cellar were 
blown out.  Ceiling panels and lighting armatures fell down.   
The force of the explosion flattened stainless steel piping.  The upper part of the 
caustic tank was deformed and the tank leg facing the P3 tank was bent 45 
degrees upwards.  The adjacent filter unit was destroyed (Figure 2).   
The severity of the explosion is perhaps best revealed by fragmentation 
damage.  The P3 tank disintegrated and tore the adjacent nitric acid tank apart.  
Tank steel fragments lodged into the solid concrete wall (Figure 3).  A stainless 
steel flange with an estimated weight of 8-10 kg originating from the bottom of 
the P3 tank traversed the hall, penetrated an electrical cabinet and caused a 
black-out (Figure 4).  The nearby water tank was pockmarked by fragment 
impact, mostly at the lower part of the tank.  Scattered crumbled tank 
fragments, damaged machinery and a deformed metal handrail is evidence of 
other forceful impacts.  The concrete pillars had corners knocked off.   
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The material damage was estimated at 8.7 mio. DKK (1.2 mio EUR).  Despite 
initial concerns about business interruption, makeshift equipment and 
improvised procedures permitted cleaning operations to continue.  The accident 
resulted in a severe business disruption but in little actual production downtime.  
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Figure 1 Overview of accident basement. The P3 steel tank disintegrated with 
such force that a flange (a) penetrated an electrical wall cabinet, frag-
ments (b) lodged into solid concrete walls and crumbled tank portions 
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Figure 2 Right: damaged filter unit, left: caustic tank.  Note flattened steel piping 




Figure 3 Tank fragments lodged in heavy concrete wall (marked as location b in 
Figure 1).  Photo courtesy of company. 
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Figure 4 Flange from lower section of P3 tank penetrated an electrical cabinet 
and caused a black out (marked as location a) in Figure 1.  Photo cour-
tesy of company. 
2.4 Investigation of reaction hazards 
The Danish Working Environment Authority requested the vendor of P3 to 
provide information on what had caused the violent reaction. The vendor 
contracted a German laboratory to investigate the hazards of mixing.  The 
laboratory carried out a desk study and produced a 1½ page report in which 
they considered two potential types of reactions: 1) oxidation of isopropanol 
and other organic compounds in P3 under the formation of aldehydes, ketones 
and carboxylic acids accompanied by the formation of nitrous oxides; 2) the 
formation of organic nitrates by reaction of isopropanol (and other alcohols) 
with nitric acid 
The report said the first type of reaction may be violent due to generation of 
heat and gasses whereas the second type of reaction leads to explosives, in this 
case isopropyl nitrate, similar to nitroglycerin and nitrocellulose.  Since the 
explosion happened after a short period of time, the German laboratory 
concluded that formation of an organic nitrate was likely.  
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3.1 Isopropyl nitrate 
Isopropyl nitrate (IUPAC name: nitric acid 1-methylethyl ester) is a white 
liquid with an ether like smell and a known monopropellant of low explosive 
sensitivity (Gizir, et al., 2005).  It has been used since the end of the Second 
World War for guided weapons propulsion (Abbott, 1980).  It has since lost 
popularity and been replaced by safer alternatives.  It is also a sensitizer in 
military explosives, promoting mixture ignition and transition to detonation 
(Zeng, et al., 2007).  At present there is interest in its potential use as a fuel or 
fuel additive for pulse detonation propulsion systems (Liu, et al., 2011).  This 
incomplete list of useful properties suffices to characterize isopropyl nitrate as a 
substance most industries would consider an unwelcome visitor, certainly 
unannounced appearances. 
3.2 Chemical incompatibility hazards  
Developments in information technology permit a more extensive literature 
review than the one carried out in 1997.  Google Scholar finds a US patent 
(Hinkamp, et al., 1956), which devises a production process for both isomers of 
propyl nitrate.  Alcohol is reacted in a mixture of sulphuric acid and nitric acid, 
with a stoichiometric excess of nitric acid.  The authors claim to have overcome 
earlier difficulties with side reactions that consume the alcohol.  Such side 
reactions not only decrease the yield, but may be so extensive as to cause the 
reaction to “become uncontrollable and hazardous”.  Direct nitration “is 
attendant with considerable risk” because of the high order of reactivity of the 
alcohol and the reactivity of the product.  The reaction temperature should be 
maintained between -8 °C and 0 °C for the production of isopropyl nitrate 
(Hinkamp, et al., 1956).   
An experimental thermometric study (El Shayeb, et al., 1987) reports that 
isopropanol is readily oxidized by nitric acid at room temperature with the 
evolution of a considerable amount of heat.  The study suggests that the 
reaction occurs after an induction period, i.e. a time lapse before the reaction 
starts.  With an initial temperature of 23 °C the duration of the induction period 
was 4-6 minutes.  A low initial temperature increased the induction period.  It is 
noteworthy that the authors make no mention of potential experimental hazards 
such as liberation of nitrous gasses or formation of isopropyl nitrate. 
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We conclude that isopropyl nitrate likely formed.  The nitric acid stored 
outdoors was at about 0 °C.  The temperature of the indoor P3 tank was 
probably about 18 °C.  We speculate if the tank inlet pipe was dipped to 
prevent splashing and the cold and slightly denser1 nitric acid accumulated at 
the bottom of the P3 tank.  Plausibly, temperature conditions were favourable 
to the formation of isopropyl nitrate, rather than oxidation side reactions which 
liberate heat and nitrous oxides.  This would be consistent with the fact that an 
operator walked past moments before the explosion not noticing anything 
unusual.  It is unlikely that he would have missed a release of nitrous oxides 
from the overflow pipe to the floor drain.  We speculate that after an induction 
period, oxidative run-away triggered explosion of the isopropyl nitrate.  A 
detonation in the bottom of the tank explains the forceful ejection of fragments, 
producing deep dents in the lower part of the nearby water tank, while only 
lightly deforming the upper part of the caustic tank.   
Ambiguity remains however, in particular the absence of concentrated 
sulphuric acid, which the patent application emphasizes should comprise up to 
68 percent by weight of the reaction mixture in order to eliminate unwanted 
oxidation reactions.  The superficial investigation by the German laboratory did 
not mention any experimental work to verify the proposed reaction chemistry 
and we have no means to investigate this issue experimentally ourselves. 
3.3 Learning processes at the brewery 
The brewery changed its chemicals handling practice.  It now stores the two 
CIP chemicals in a small separate building and the receiving nozzles to the 
tanks are of different dimensions.  Deliveries are by two different vendors and 
access to a nozzle requires two keys of which the truck driver brings one.  
Although the ingenuity of human error is immense, the likelihood of accidental 
mixing during raw materials handling appears to be remote with this 
arrangement.  
3.4 Learning processes at the industry association? 
The brewery said it presented the accident and lessons learned at brewery 
industry association meetings.  Information exchange activities in such forums 
can be effective as attendees comprise industries where identical mixing errors 
could take place.  The absence of written records however, makes such 
information exchange dependent on precarious personal contacts and memory.  
The safety committee of the Association of Danish Process Industries (FDKI) 
has published updated SDSs for about 250 chemicals since the 1960s.  The 
work was discontinued in 2011 due to lack of funding.  In the most recent 
edition (KS, 2010) the SDS for nitric acid only mentions spontaneous ignition 
and liberation of nitrous fumes in case of accidental mixing, not the formation 
                                                   
1  The density of 62 percent nitric acid @ 0 °C is 1.4039 g/cm3 (Perry & Green, 1984) (Per-
ry and Green 1984:3-81),   The datasheet for P3 states the density @ 20 °C is 1.35 g/cm3 
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of a potent explosive.  The omission indicates that the impact of information 
exchange in industry forums is limited.  
3.5 Learning processes at the vendor? 
Written inquiries to the vendor of P3 for information if other chemical 
incompatibility incidents have taken place were fruitless.  Reached 
telephonically, the vendor said isopropanol is no longer an ingredient in the 
vendor’s CIP cleaner.  Isopropanol was merely acting as a solvent and stabilizer 
to keep other additives in solution and this functionality could be achieved 
using other additives.  
From a learning perspective it is relevant to speculate if the substitution of 
isopropanol was motivated in concerns over chemical incompatibility hazards.  
The fragmented and circumstantial evidence available to us suggest this is 
unlikely.  Google finds P3 safety data sheets in Swedish and Czech languages 
dated in 2005 and 2006 with a product composition similar to the Danish 1994 
data sheet, indicative that an unmodified product was sold in these countries at 
least nine years after the Danish accident.  The data sheets are silent on the 
incompatibility hazards with nitric acid.  We observe that the substitution of 
isopropanol had other benefits; in particular it eliminated the flammability 
rating of the product.   
3.6 Learning processes at the Danish authorities? 
The police investigation followed a standard police crime scene procedure with 
no attention paid to process safety issues, e.g. there are no registrations of tank 
levels, flow rates or temperatures; no recordings of fragment size, weight, 
trajectory and position; no attention given to underlying systemic deficiencies 
or root causes. 
The Danish Working Environment Authority made no effort to investigate the 
accident themselves but relied on the police investigation and the vendor study.  
The Authority took the brewery to court for violation of its general obligations 
to plan and execute work in a safe manner.  The Authority pointed to a 
chemical safety citation the year before, in which a batch of caustic had been 
neutralized with nitric acid exposing workers to acid fumes in excess of the 
threshold value.  The citation is entirely irrelevant from a chemical reaction 
hazard point of view.  Nevertheless, the Authority stated, with considerable 
public brouhaha, that the citation warranted an above-normal penalty.  The 
court agreed and the brewery was convicted and fined DKK 80,000 (10,700 
EUR), about one percent of the property damage.   
The Authority's local branch office has since closed.  All persons originally 
involved with the case have retired or moved on to other jobs.  Two were 
reached telephonically; to their knowledge no dissemination efforts took place.  
The dominant perception at the time was that the brewery gave insufficient 
managerial attention to workplace safety and health issues.  The main priority 
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of the Authority was to rectify the managerial attention deficit, using available 
enforcement powers.   
3.7 Survival of basic accident information  
We have argued that the 1997 accident highlighted an incompatibility hazard 
which has broad relevance for industry, authorities and safety professionals 
working with preventive risk analysis.  It is therefore noteworthy that it has all 
but disappeared from open sources.  Some media articles can be located in 
Infomedia, a Danish proprietary media article repository well hidden behind a 
pay-wall, but the articles only report the explosion event, the legal aftermath 
and the penalty.   
The kind of information necessary for safety professionals to understand the 
case and prevent recurrence is wholly absent - there is no mention of the 
chemical incompatibility with isopropanol.  Articles in newspapers with 
nationwide circulation are marred with misleading factual errors, misstating 
nitrous oxides as chlorine, such as “Chlorine fumes released in town centre” 
(Berl, 1997).  The explosion is briefly mentioned in a report for the Danish 
EPA on chemical facility hazard analysis (Taylor, 2007); incorrectly however, 
as the isopropanol reactant is misstated as formaldehyde (!).  We conclude that 
the information available in the public or pay regime is garbled beyond 
recognition.  We also note that the accident is absent2 in the EU major accident 
reporting system (MARS).     
3.8 Information on the explosion hazard available to 
accident prevention professionals  
We have not been able to locate a SDS on nitric acid or isopropanol that 
mentions the explosion hazard upon accidental mixing.  Some information can 
be found in specialized reference works on chemical incompatibility hazards 
available at university libraries.  Bretherick's handbook of reactive chemical 
hazards (Urben, 2012) provides the most comprehensive description. The entry 
for nitric acid states that it is the common chemical most frequently involved in 
reactive incidents and if anywhere near stoichiometric composition, a 
homogeneous mixture of nitric acid and virtually any organic is a sensitive high 
explosive.  A case is presented in which the reaction of five litres of 
isopropanol reacted with concentrated nitric acid, which bursted the reactor.  
Bretherick's entry for isopropanol makes no mention of the explosion hazard, 
however.  Wiley’s handbook to Chemical Incompatibilities (Pohanish & 
Greene, 2009) states that nitric acid will “react violently” with a long list of 
                                                   
2  It probably meets reporting obligation criteria of the Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC, 
1997) , as it led to “evacuation or confinement of persons for more than two hours, (persons 
x hours): the value at least 500” (96/82/EC, 1997).  However, this directive was only im-
plemented in Danish law much later, by executive order 106 dated 2000.  At the time of the 
accident, only the earlier Seveso I directive was in effect, by executive order 520 dated 
1990, where reporting criteria are unspecific.  
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substances, alcohols included –explosion is not mentioned.  Wiley’s entry for 
isopropanol similarly merely states that it will “react violently” with nitric acid. 
We found passing mention (Whetton & Armstrong, 1994) of the same accident 
mentioned in Bretherick’s involving five 1itres of isopropanol.  Some 
laboratory incidents involving nitric acid and alcohols are available (American 
Industrial Hygiene Association, no date), (American Industrial Hygiene 
Association, 2004) but these case descriptions were very difficult to retrieve, 
and laboratory flasks may have burst due to gas evolution and internal 
overpressure rather than due to formation of an explosive.   
Specialists in organic chemistry inform us that the reaction between 
concentrated nitric acid and alcohols is “well known”, in particular the reaction 
to produce glyceryl trinitrate (nitroglycerine).  This reaction normally requires 
an excess of highly concentrated (fuming) nitric acid, or the presence of 
concentrated sulphuric acid however, and such conditions were clearly not met 
in this accident.  Any effect of the presence of phosphoric acid in the P3 is 
unknown.  The German laboratory’s rudimentary report is silent on these 
issues. 
A frequently cited handbook on hygiene control in the food industry pays 
surprisingly little attention to incompatibility hazards of CIP chemicals.  A case 
with nitric acid is presented in which the consequence was evolution of nitrous 
gasses –the potential formation of explosives is not mentioned (Rosner, 2005). 
We conclude that the available literature is sparse on the formation of a potent 
explosive whereas the comparatively more benign evolution of nitrous oxides 
upon mixing of concentrated nitrous acids with organics is well-known.  We 
have serious doubts if the average chemist would identify the explosion hazard 
when faced with a routine chemical incompatibility enquiry – even more if the 
average safety professional would do so. 
3.9 Barriers to reporting, investigation, dissemination, 
learning  
The vendor of P3 has met our request for information to this article with 
reluctance.  Such reluctance is natural.  Common sense suggests that a 
company will not aggressively inform its customers and competitors about 
product issues which could potentially lead to brand damage and hurt sales.  
Using principal–agent theory, Fauchart (2006) argues that information 
asymmetries are at play which can be a source of moral hazard that impedes 
learning. 
To the brewery the accident was a traumatic event and they have since taken 
effective safety precautions to prevent recurrence. The production supervisor 
expressed genuine concerns about mixing hazards, and some frustration - these 
chemicals are used “everywhere”.  The brewery’s work practices improved but 
it has not engaged in broad lessons-learned dissemination activities.  This is 
only to be expected.  Milton Friedman’s dictum “The business of business is 
Violent explosion after inadvertent mixing of nitric acid and isopropanol – review 15 years later finds basic accident data 
corrupted, no evidence of broad learning 
C:\Users\Public\Documents\4 Brewery 1997-33-preprint.docx 
19 
.  
business” implies that spending company resources to investigate and report 
lessons learned for the benefit of others would make a weak business case.  
Only expenses are visible; negative publicity is a concern and benefits are at 
best uncertain and intangible. 
The Danish Working Environment Authority viewed the accident as a 
management deficit, a workplace and organizational dysfunction, an inability to 
prevent a foreseeable human error.  The Authority pursued a narrow legal court 
case approach, myopically seeing the explosion as the result of brewery-
specific chemicals, involving a fuzzy chemical product “P3”, not identifying 
the culprit as isopropanol, even less realizing that other alcohols exhibit a 
similar incompatibility hazards with nitric acid.  To the Authority, assigning 
managerial blame and winning the court case defined a mission complete.  
Although the Working Environment Authority appears to have been the party 
with the best overview of events, access to the largest resource base, and the 
broadest accident prevention mandate, there is no evidence of investigation, 
dissemination, broader learning, or organizational memory.  
It is particularly troubling that the Authority seems to have overlooked the 
significance of the chemical incompatibility, that this accident could well have 
happened elsewhere.  We speculate that the German laboratory’s superficial 
desk study report came late, when the case had moved to the Authority's legal 
department, who were narrowly concerned with issues of compliance, 
culpability and penalty, not accident prevention. 
3.10 Learning revisited 
Returning to the CHAIN model of Lindberg et al. (2010) we conclude that the 
experience feedback chain was disrupted at the very introductory steps: the 
accident was neither properly investigated nor reported.  Because the process is 
truly a chain in the sense that the process as a whole fails if any one of its links 
fails, only site specific learning took place, opportunities for broader learning 
were wholly missed. 
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Inadvertent mixing of 62 percent nitric acid with a proprietary chemical 
comprising 5-15 percent isopropanol likely formed isopropyl nitrate, a rocket 
propellant, which exploded violently.  The accident clearly had multiple 
fatalities potential.  We argue that the widespread usage of the two chemicals 
across industries, the innocent nature of the human error and the severity of the 
consequence would make this accident a prime candidate for accident 
investigation and broad dissemination of lessons learned.  
We conclude that in this case such learning opportunities were wholly missed.  
Information in open sources available to safety professional today, some 15 
years later, indicate that the hazards of mixing isopropanol and nitric acid relate 
to the formation of heat and poisonous fumes of nitrous oxides, not the 
formation of a potent explosive.  A determined individual with prior knowledge 
of the 1997 explosion accident, sifting through available sources in the public 
or pay regime, can only find information garbled beyond recognition, with no 
useful facts for chemical incompatibility accident prevention. 
The trend in industrial accident prevention in Denmark over the past two 
decades has been a shift away from standards and codes that define specific 
minimum safe practices towards a risk based approach where each cased is 
judged on its own merits.  For a risk-based approach to be effective, availability 
of relevant information, e.g. the severity of the consequences, is critical - or 
risks may be scored too low.  Companies are likely to take more precautions to 
avoid a sudden accidental violent detonation than to avoid an accidental release 
of nitrous oxides, presumably with a slow onset. 
The Polluter Pays Principle plays an important role in Danish policy.  This case 
indicates that care should be taken not to misapply this principle to accident 
investigation and learning, delegating such obligations to the parties directly 
affected.  We argue, as do Dien et al. (2012) and Dechy et al. (2012), that 
investigations should be independent.  We furthermore argue, as do Fauchart 
(2006), that it appears critical to provide some sort of institutional support to 
facilitate learning.   
Major chemical accidents cannot be prevented solely through command and 
control regulatory requirements but by understanding the fundamental root 
causes, widely disseminating the lessons learned, and integrating these lessons 
learned into safe operations.  Few would argue that these goals are wrong.  Yet 
they appear to be difficult to achieve in practice.  
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